What lies beyond for Yemen?
Two key foreign-policy players — the USA and Saudi Arabia — hesitate. Saleh used to be their ally in the fight against Al-Qaida, obedient to Americans and loyal to Saudis. Yet support of the antagonizing regime might come out dangerous for them. Every Yemenite is aware that President used to take money from them, which is why they afraid that opposition may try to draw equality sign between him and his foreign allies.
Lessons of Egypt and Tunisia made Arabian leaders consider certain preemptive measures that might have helped them to hold the power and prevent people’s riots. It is already clear that force won’t stop the revolutions. Increasing number of victims only improves the resoluteness of the survivors. Poverty and lawlessness make people fearless — they simply have nothing to lose in strict accordance with classic Marxist formula. Yemen, though, is a bit different from other Arab countries, going through a revolutionary period.
This is one of the poorest Arab countries. Unemployment, corruption, total illiteracy and overpopulation — all of that draw quite a gloomy picture. Despite certain territorial remoteness from Europe, Yemen holds a substantial geopolitical significance for the Old Continent. It owns a part of eastern Red Sea coast and northern part of Gulf of Aden along with the Bab el-Mandeb strait that connects both basins. Maritime trade route leading to the Suez Canal goes through the Yemenite territorial waters — it is a transit path for the oil from Persian Gulf and goods from South-Eastern Asia. This part of the world ocean has recently become notorious thanks to Somali pirates.
Yemen is a territory of Al-Qaida. This organization has not only attacked foreigners and diplomatic missions within the country, but also served as a logistics base for acts of terror abroad. Al-Qaida camps, where terrorists from all over the world train, are also situated in Yemen.
Ali Abdullah Saleh has been holding the post of Yemenite President for more than thirty years. He’s a very experienced politician, who survived the unification of South and North Yemen back in the 90s. He won the civil war of 1994 against the Husi resistance group. Saleh always grounded at tribal discords in his domestic policy, having skillfully set the clans that have been at loggerheads for centuries onto each other. This allowed him to distract Yemenites from the vital issues of national life. Contemporary situation in Yemen can only be understood through the analysis of tribal relations. The West has erroneously perceived Yemen as a state with relatively democratic system. At first glance it may seem so — there really are political parties, parliamentarian opposition and rotation of state officials. However, this fake façade is merely a screen for sophisticated system of relative ties. Yemenite tribes do not influence the political situation in the country — they create it. It is outskirts, who truly rule the country, rather than center, so the latter one has to take them into consideration to save at least the semblance of control.
Yemenite tribes are grouped into various blocs. The most influential ones are Hashid and Bakil, which are dubbed confederations over there. The tribes hold the territories south (from Amran to Sa’ada), east and north-east (al-Jawf) of Sana. Hashid confederation has always been closer to leadership and during the last decade it ousted Bakil from power. Both alignments have traditionally competed for influence over North Yemen, although this rivalry has never come as far as the open stand. Tribal means of blackmailing the central power were the kidnappings of foreigners, who were freed after demands of blackmailers were met. Those demands were not just moderate, but quite comical indeed — say building of a road or a school at the tribal territory. Today’s street turmoil is a result of changes in tribal leadership. Old, time-tested leaders, whom Saleh has bought in the immemorial times, have been replaced with younger, angry and starving successors, whom nearly 70-year-old President fails to negotiate with.
Initial reason of the Yemenite “revolution” is the conflict of two alignments that has been smoldering for years. The first one is represented by President Saleh himself — he is originally from the Sanhan tribe, which is a part of Hashid confederation. Its center is the al-Ahmar village, located south from Sana. Since the very beginning of his rule, Saleh has surrounded himself with members of this tribe, i.e. his close and distant relatives. In fact, one could have used the Yemenite top military command to study family tree of Sanhan tribe. Most part of influential businessmen and politicians in Yemen are relatives of President Saleh. The second alignment is the Al-Ahmar family. It was headed by Abdullah Al-Ahmar who passed two years ago — he had a great influence over President. He was a sheikh of Hashid, i.e. traditional leader of all tribes that belonged to this confederation. Abdullah supported President with his authority, but as the saying goes, the den was too small for two great bears. Ten (!) sons have come to replace the great sheikh. These young “revolutionaries” have started a fight against President Saleh. Until everything was calm around Yemen they hadn’t a single chance to shake the system of presidential power that has been establishing for decades. Yet, with the Arab Spring ruling Yemenites’ minds, street riots burst out.
When in the middle of March this year President Saleh undertook a trip over North Yemen, willing to seek for support of the local tribal leaders, sons of the late great sheikh — with Hussein and Hamid being the most notable of them — have followed his footsteps. Armed-to-teeth fighters from the Hashid tribe gave the successors and heirs of great sheikh a hearty welcome. That encouraged them so much that Hussein even said:
“I’m calling to all the noble Yemenites” (and who’d like to admit that he’s not a noble Yemenite, I dare to ask) “to overthrow the regime. Yemenite nation won’t keep silence, beholding the blood of martyrs that is spilled on the streets. We will revenge.”
Power started to slip off the hands of President Saleh. He even began criticizing the USA and accusing Americans of inspiring the demonstrations, although all along the way the United States have been his main sponsor. Saleh’s army is not bursting into action at all; sentiments that reign among the troops can without a hint of exaggeration be called defeatist. Sa’ada garrison (near the border with Saudi Arabia) has even refused to obey an officer from Sanhan family (i.e. to President’s relative). Saleh swallowed the pill and appointed another commander. Yemenite puzzle covers a risk of a bloody conflict, simultaneously making tribal leaders to act very cautiously, although keeping their material interests in mind, of course. In the very beginning of Yemenite protests Saleh has said a remarkable phrase: “It will either be me or chaos”. Does chaos actually threatens to reign in Yemen in case if President Saleh actually steps down.
Ali Abdullah Saleh occupied the Presidential post of North Yemen in 1978. This was an uneasy period in the life of a country. In the 60s the war between royalists, who supported Imam, and republicans was under way. The latter ones, being supported by Egyptian President Naser, have overthrown traditional Yemenite form of power — imamate — that existed in the country since the 9th century. In 1970 Saudi Arabia that used to have a status of regional power at the moment, has denounced its ambitions. Peace treaty was signed and the unstable Yemenite Arab Republic crystallized from the crucible of the civil war. Various tribes from the north of the country took part in the war. Their role was so great that the post-war period became a sort of Renaissance for the tribal system. That was the time when above-mentioned Abdullah al-Ahmar became one of the main tribal authorities. He supported the republic, rendering new authorities the support of tribes and sheikhs, he represented. Tribal leaders have met the attempts to weaken influence of sheikhs over the armed forces with decisive rebuff. Two of Saleh’s predecessors were assassinated. Saleh was a different man, though. Being a poorly-educated military with tribal origins, he had no reformative ambitions. He grew up in a clannish system and made career thanks to it. It were clans that he built his authority upon. He won the civil war of 1994, when South Yemen attempted to stand up for its independence. War was the main mean of holding power for him. Saleh understood that in an unruly, poor and stuffed with weapons country there should always be an enemy, you’d be able to successfully fight. There had to be a permanent conflict, distracting people’s attentions from severe economic situation. Israel, Iran, immigrants and Husi group have replaced each other at the post of this enemy.
Gradually, the most committed of his aides and adherents — like Abdullah al-Ahmar, Yahya al-Mutawakkil, Abu Shuwarib — started to disappear from his environment. They’ve been growing old and dying, being replaced with the younger generation. These were the people without their own biography. They’ve been “made” by Saleh. That was the exact reason why they were unable to replace previous, independent presidential aides, who always had their own opinion. Generation of young timeservers, constantly peering into the eyes of their chief, they were only giving him advice he was willing to hear. In fact, they’ve screened the President from reality with their servility.
People started to hit the Sana streets after the 11th of February, when Egyptian President Mubarak was dislodged. On the 18th of March, when demonstrators started to gather after usual Friday prayer, manslaughter started. Square was surrounded by snipers in advance and they’ve started to shoot at protesters. 50 people died. Saleh was unable to think of better excuse than to explain such number of victims by the irritation of dwellers of the houses that adjoined the square. According to him, they were so annoyed by the noise of the crowd that they started to shoot at protesters. In three days, on the 21st of March General Muhsin al-Ahmar has fled the sinking ship of President Saleh, who backed President during all the years of his presidency. General was the military cornerstone of Saleh’s power, he commanded the Yemenite north-western military district — one out of four. Runaway general called for Saleh to step down, having promised that his troops will protect the protesting demonstrators. Since then random fights between President’s Guard and the military started to take place.
Saleh’s fate is apparently predetermined. What will happen to Yemen after him is not an idle question at all. Geopolitical importance of this country was analyzed in the beginning of the article. Opposition resembles a patchwork blanket — poor folks, dreaming of better lot, students, intellectuals, Muslim priesthood, Al-Qaida followers, Husi warriors, separate tribes. All of them want Saleh to leave, yet all of them pursue their own goals. Two key foreign-policy players — the USA and Saudi Arabia — hesitate. Saleh used to be their ally in the fight against Al-Qaida, obedient to Americans and loyal to Saudis. Yet support of the antagonizing regime might come out dangerous for them. Every Yemenite is aware that President used to take money from them, which is why they afraid that opposition may try to draw equality sign between him and his foreign allies. Given — putting it mildly — lack of President Saleh’s civil manners, after his leave Yemen will most likely run wild furthermore. Tribal wars and increasing influence of Al-Qaeda seem to be the most probable prospect for this country.
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